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ABSTRACT 
Mentalizing—the capacity to understand others’ and one’s own behavior in terms of 
mental states—is a defining human social and psychological achievement.  It 
involves a complex and demanding spectrum of capacities that are susceptible to 
different strengths, weakness and failings; personality disorders (PDs) are often 
associated with severe and consistent mentalizing difficulties (Fonagy & Bateman, 
2008). In this paper we will argue for the role of mentalizing in the therapeutic 
relationship, suggesting that although Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT) may be 
a specific and particular form of practice, the “mentalizing therapist” is a universal 
constituent of effective psychotherapeutic interventions.  
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The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic Relationship 
Mentalizing theory was first elaborated in the context of formulating 
mentalization-based treatment (MBT) for the treatment of patients with Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) in a partial hospital setting; MBT has more recently 
developed into a more comprehensive approach to the understanding and treatment 
of personality disorders in a range of clinical contexts. In this paper, we attempt to 
broaden our argument in relation to mentalizing and rather than explaining the 
particulars of the MBT approach (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006), we postulate that 
mentalizing might productively be conceptualised as the common factor across 
different forms of effective psychotherapy. Further, in understanding the mechanisms 
by which mentalizing works and how it can become disrupted, we broaden our 
argument to encompass the developmental significance of the transmission of 
epistemic trust in relation to social learning in the attachment context.  
 Mentalizing in therapy is a generic way of establishing epistemic trust (trust in 
the authenticity and personal relevance of interpersonally transmitted information) 
(D. B. Wilson & D. Sperber, 2012) between the patient and the therapist in a way 
that helps the patient to relinquish the rigidity that characterizes individuals with 
enduring personality pathology. The relearning of flexibility allows the patient to go 
on to learn, socially, from new experiences and achieve change in their 
understanding of their social relationships and their own behavior and actions.  The 
very experience of having our subjectivity understood – of being mentalized – is a 
necessary trigger for us to be able to receive and learn from the social knowledge 
that has the potential to change our perception of ourselves and our social world.   
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Mentalizing in the Therapeutic Relationship and the Motion of Epistemic Trust 
Mentalizing – despite in many ways being a defining human accomplishment 
– is not constitutionally guaranteed.  It is, rather, a potential developmentally fulfilled 
in the early years of life; it is a developmental process that relies on good enough 
attachment relationships and early attachments in particular, as they reflect the 
extent to which our subjective experiences were adequately mirrored by a trusted 
other: i.e., the extent to which attachment figures have been able to respond with 
contingent and marked affective displays of their own experience in response to the 
infant’s subjective experience, thus enabling the child to develop second-order 
representations of its own subjective experiences (Fonagy, 1998).  
There is considerable evidence that a caregiver’s capacity to mentalize 
predicts attachment in a child.  Studies examining different ways in which caregivers’ 
mentalizing is operationalized—including prenatal RF (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, 
Moran, & Higgitt, 1991), child-specific RF (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & 
Locker, 2005), mind-related comments (Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 
2001; Meins et al., 2002), and various other measures (Aber, Slade, Berger, Bresgi, 
& Kaplan, 1985; Koren-Karie, Oppenheim, Dolev, Sher, & Etzion-Carasso, 2002; 
Oppenheim, Koren-Karie, & Sagi, 2001; Sethna, Murray, & Ramchandani, 2012; 
Solomon & George, 1999) – have found that each of these facets of mentalizing 
capacity predicts attachment security in the child.  To summarize this literature, it 
seems that Ainsworth’s concept of sensitivity relates to the infant’s sense of being 
recognized as an intentional agent, whether in the context of physical expressions of 
agency (Shai & Belsky, 2011a, 2011b) or more traditionally assessed indicators of 
sensitivity (Bretherton, 2013).  Additionally, the caregiver’s capacity to mentalize can 
offer protection from caregiver-related risk factors that are associated with 
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generating attachment insecurity, such as maternal trauma and disruptive maternal 
behaviors (e.g., Stronach, Toth, Rogosch, & Cicchetti, 2013).  Furthermore, we know 
that the benefits of caregiver mentalizing extend beyond attachment outcomes: good 
mentalizing on the part of the caregiver is associated with higher performance of 
children in social cognition tasks (Laranjo, Bernier, Meins, & Carlson, 2010; Meins et 
al., 2002) and with general social cognitive development (Meins et al., 2003).  In 
contrast, social environments characterized by adversity (e.g., child neglect or 
abuse) impair cognitive development (Ayoub et al., 2009; Fernald, Weber, Galasso, 
& Ratsifandrihamanana, 2011; G. S. Goodman, Quas, & Ogle, 2010; Rieder & 
Cicchetti, 1989).  In brief, sensitivity to the young child’s emerging intentionality, their 
nascent sense of subjective self inferred through parental mentalizing, increases the 
chance of secure attachment, enhances their resilience to adversity, and promotes 
cognitive, social-cognitive, and emotion-regulating capacity. 
The related implied question is: by what mechanism does the child profit from 
the caregiver’s mentalizing behavior?  Answers to this may have powerful 
ramifications for our understanding of social development, as well as our 
understanding of how therapeutic interventions for BPD and other disorders 
characterized by interpersonal difficulties might work.  We have argued elsewhere 
(Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2013), building on pioneering work by Dan Sperber 
(Sperber et al., 2010; D. Wilson & D. Sperber, 2012) and accumulating evidence 
(e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009), that secure attachment experiences do not just pave 
the way for the acquisition of mentalizing, but that they are also key to the formation 
of epistemic trust—that is, an individual’s willingness to consider new knowledge 
from another person as trustworthy, generalizable, and relevant to the self.  In other 
words, attachment may mediate the reliable transmission of knowledge from one 
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generation to the next; secure attachment helps to create a benign condition for the 
relaxation of epistemic vigilance, sensitive and appropriate ostensive cueing (see 
below), is a key constituent element of sensitivity on the part of the primary 
caregiver.  Attachment is a much older instinct, in evolutionary terms, than the 
imperative to generate epistemic trust; in that sense the two processes are distinct. 
In terms of the phenomenology of child development, however, they are closely 
interwoven.  We shall now explore some recent evidence on this topic and consider 
its relevance to our understanding the role of mentalizing in the therapeutic 
relationship. 
The Transmission of Culture: Natural Pedagogy and Epistemic Trust 
The theory of natural pedagogy developed by Csibra and Gergely (2009) may 
offer a model to explain how an individual’s attachment history could create distinct 
epistemic states.  The theory posits a cue-driven social cognitive adaptation of 
mutual design dedicated to ensuring a highly effective and efficient transfer of 
culturally relevant knowledge between human beings.  Csibra and Gergely argue 
that human communication is an evolutionary product of the requirement to transmit 
cognitively opaque cultural knowledge: generic knowledge that is robust to 
interference, is kind-generalizable, and becomes experienced as shared, in the 
sense that it immediately generates an expectation that others belonging to the 
same social group possess the same knowledge.  Csibra and Gergely build on an 
idea first discussed by Bertrand Russell (1940) and extensively used by Sperber and 
Wilson (1995), suggesting that an agent uses certain signals to prepare the 
addressee for the intent of the agent to communicate.  These cues may also serve to 
moderate natural epistemic vigilance (the self-protective suspicion towards 
information coming from others that may be potentially damaging, deceptive, or 
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inaccurate).  Russell suggested that a process of ostension—the signaling of 
communicative intent—takes place as a part of communication.  According to the 
theory of natural pedagogy, ostensive cues generate an attentional state in the 
addressee such that natural disbelief (what Sperber & Wilson, 1995 termed 
epistemic vigilance)  is momentarily suspended and the addressee feels that the 
subsequent communication will contain information specifically relevant to them that 
should be remembered and encoded with other knowledge relevant to social 
situations.  Such information could be about an object or the communicator’s views 
and attitudes about the object, or about the beliefs communicated by the other 
(communicator) about the self (addressee) that are to be regarded as generalizable 
and relevant across situations.  The information can be stored and used as part of 
procedural and semantic memory, not uniquely or as primarily episodic memory.  
The distinction between these memory systems is well established in neuroscience 
(Squire, 2004). 
We have suggested that the concept of ostension, driving natural pedagogy, 
and maternal sensitivity, driving attachment security conceived in terms of 
mentalizing or sensitivity to intentional state, are loosely coupled and overlapping 
constructs (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007a).  A securely attached child will 
believe their caregiver to be a reliable source of knowledge because the caregiver is 
more likely to have used ostension in the history of their relationship with the child.  
The predictors of secure attachment relationships are essentially also ostensive 
communication cues.  The consistent emotional responses of a sensitive caregiver 
are clearly expressed to the child via ostensive cues such as making eye contact, 
accurate turn-taking, appropriate contingent (in time, tone, content) reactivity, and 
frequent use of a special communicational tone that addresses the child’s 
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experiential world.  All such cues appear to trigger a special mode of learning in the 
infant (G. Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Kiraly, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013).  The biological 
predisposition of the caregiver to respond contingently to the infant’s expressive 
displays creates a foundation for the infant to acquire further knowledge from that 
caregiver (Gergely, 2013).   
During “marked mirroring interactions” (the caregiver’s use of exaggerated 
facial displays and vocalizations in response to the infant’s expressions of emotion to 
reflect how the infant is feeling back to the infant, but in a “play-acting” manner; 
Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Gergely & Watson, 1996), the caregiver 
“marks” his/her referential emotion displays to signal the generalizability of 
knowledge and effectively instruct the infant about the infant’s subjective experience: 
“Look at me” (marked display/ostensive cue), “this is what you are feeling” (culturally 
transmitted self-knowledge; Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007b).  In other words, 
“marking” by the caregiver serves as an ostensive cue to the infant that the mirrored 
affect signals are relevant and generalizable.  Babies display a sensitivity in relation 
to particular ostensive behavioral signals such as direct eye contact or being talked 
to with the special intonation of “motherese” (G Csibra & Gergely, 2006; G. Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009, 2011).  They show attention preferentially to such signals, and the 
impact of these signals on their behavior is readily apparent.   
To summarize, ostensive cues from the caregiver trigger epistemic trust at the 
same time as increasing the chance of a secure child–parent attachment (Fonagy et 
al., 2007b).  Ostension sets aside the biological protection provided by epistemic 
vigilance and opens a channel of information exchange for transmitting and receiving 
knowledge about the social and personally relevant world, while encoding the 
information with the authority but not the person of the communicator, and helping to 
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ensure it will be remembered.  Ostensive cues signal that we must go beyond a 
specific physical experience and acquire information that will be relevant across a 
range of settings.  Epistemic trust is there to ensure that the individual can safely 
change their position; it triggers the opening of what we can think of as an “epistemic 
superhighway”—an evolutionarily protected mechanism that signals readiness to 
acquire knowledge.  
Research has provided evidence of the links between attachment security and 
the ability to generate epistemic trust.  In a longitudinal study of attachment, 147 
children whose attachment was assessed in infancy were tested twice for epistemic 
trust at 50 and 61 months of age (Corriveau et al., 2009).  For the test, the child’s 
mother and a stranger made conflicting claims to the child concerning (a) the name 
of an unfamiliar object, (b) the name of a hybrid animal made up of 50% of each of 
two animals (e.g., an image made up of 50% horse and 50% cow; the mother might 
call it a cow, while the stranger says it is a horse), and (c) the name of a hybrid 
animal made up of 75% of one animal and 25% of another.  In the latter case, the 
mother always made the improbable claim (e.g., that a picture made up of 75% 
squirrel and 25% rabbit was a rabbit), while the stranger gave the more likely answer 
(“squirrel”).  The study aimed to gather data on which adult the child would 
spontaneously turn to for information and which they would believe, and whether this 
behavior was moderated by history of attachment security.  The nature of a child’s 
attachment relationship turned out to have a powerful effect on the child’s trust in 
information imparted by the attachment figure (mother) and others (stranger).  
Children who were securely attached in infancy used a flexible strategy, showing a 
preference toward accepting claims made by their mother when they were plausible 
but trusting their own perception when the mother’s claims appeared improbable.  
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Insecure-avoidant children appeared to withhold trust in their mother and preferred to 
attend to information from the stranger, while insecure-resistant children withheld 
trust in the stranger’s claims even when their mother made improbable claims.  
Children with insecure-disorganized histories evidenced what we may call chronic 
epistemic vigilance or epistemic hypervigilance; they appeared to regard both 
information sources with suspicion.  They had not much more trust in information 
given by the mother than by the stranger, but also showed little confidence in their 
own perception. 
Attachment security, rooted in a history of feeling recognized, appears to 
increase the likelihood of trust in a source of communication when it is reasonably 
credible.  A secure attachment history also generates confidence in one’s own 
experience and belief and empowers one’s judgment.  In contrast, a history of 
attachment avoidance may generate epistemic mistrust; anxious attachment creates 
epistemic uncertainty through overreliance on the views of the attachment figure; 
and disorganized attachment can create epistemic hypervigilance, the mistrust of 
both the attachment figure and strangers as a source of information.  In a child with a 
history of disorganized attachment, the unresolvable question “Who can I trust?” 
might contribute to this epistemic hypervigilance.  As the study shows, children with 
a history of attachment disorganization mistrust information from attachment figures 
and strangers, and even their own experience.  While an insecure attachment history 
may preclude complete confidence in one’s subjective experience, an organized 
strategy biases either toward (insecure-resistant) or away from (insecure-avoidant) 
the attachment figure.  But if neither source can be trusted, an unending epistemic 
search may ensue.  The child seeks others to confirm or deny his/her own 
understanding, which he/she has little faith in, but, being unable to trust information 
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received from others, remains in a state of uncertainty and epistemic vigilance.  This 
generates a state of interminable searching for validation of experience, coupled with 
the chronic lack of trust that we describe here as epistemic hypervigilance.   This 
brings to mind many patients, but a young woman with BPD diagnosis in particular, 
who chronically lacked confidence in the accuracy of her interpersonal experiences 
(e.g. if X whom she met recently liked her or not) and would seek confirmation from 
friends and family only to find their response, whether confirmation or denial, 
unsatisfactory.  But being thrown back on her own judgment failed to provide the 
desired certainty, leaving her to seek further independent verification in what 
appeared at times to be an interminable and frustrating process. 
We suggest that while attachment may be a key mechanism for mediating 
epistemic trust, it is secondary to an underlying biological process preserved by 
evolution.  In other words, secure attachment is unlikely to be necessary for 
generating epistemic trust but it may be sufficient to do so, and, further, it is the most 
pervasive mechanism in early childhood because it is a highly evolutionarily effective 
indicator of trustworthiness.  Given that the infant needs to overcome the barrier 
created by natural epistemic vigilance and open their mind to acquiring the many 
pieces of culturally relevant information on which their survival will ultimately depend, 
it makes sense for humans to have evolved a mechanism to facilitate knowledge 
transmission between the teacher and the learner, based normally on a shared 
genetic inheritance (Hamilton, 1964).   
Attachment, Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust 
As outlined in the previous section, we believe that, through down-regulation 
of affect triggered by proximity-seeking in the distressed infant, attachment not only 
establishes a lasting bond between child and caregiver, but also opens a channel for 
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information to be used for knowledge transfer between generations.  This is well 
demonstrated in studies of cognitive styles associated with patterns of attachment in 
adulthood. 
Adult attachment insecurity is associated with a greater likelihood of cognitive 
closure, a lower tolerance for ambiguity, and a more pronounced tendency for 
dogmatic thinking (Mikulincer, 1997).  Individuals with insecure attachment are also 
more likely to save intellectual effort and adopt stereotypes (Mikulincer, 1997).  The 
same predisposition to knowledge inflexibility is apparent in the tendency of insecure 
individuals to make judgments based only on early information and to take 
subsequent information into account insufficiently (Green-Hennessy & Reis, 1998; 
Mikulincer, 1997).  Insecure individuals, who fear the loss of their attachment figures, 
also anxiously hold on to their initial constructions.  Kruglanski (Kruglanski, 1989; 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008) proposed the concept of 
epistemic freezing, characterized by a tendency to defend existing knowledge 
structures even when they are incorrect or misleading (see also Fiske & Taylor, 
1991).  We consider that such a defensive strategy may be adaptive if an individual’s 
self-esteem is vulnerable.  Cognitive closure, dogmatism, and conservatism may 
simply be strategies to safeguard an inadequately individuated self (Bowlby, 1980).  
By contrast, the greater confidence of secure individuals enables them to be less 
defensive in relation to opening their minds to information that challenges their 
existing assumptions. 
Mikulincer (1997) suggested that insecure individuals are more readily 
threatened by information that challenges their knowledge structures because their 
sense of self is vulnerable—in particular to being emotionally overwhelmed.  If 
emotional dysregulation is experienced as a real and imminent threat, such 
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individuals may opt for knowledge stability, which temporarily serves to down-
regulate arousal.  Insecure individuals are less likely to revise their knowledge when 
faced with information that challenges their assumptions (Green-Hennessy & Reis, 
1998; Green & Campbell, 2000; Mikulincer, 1997; Mikulincer & Arad, 1999), as if 
they not only have less confidence in the robustness of their bond to their attachment 
figure, but also fear the loss of epistemic trust.  In sum, we assume that the 
epistemic superhighway that enables us to learn from others and from social 
experience is less efficient in those whose attachment representation in relation to 
their caregiver is insecure. 
Developmental adversity, and particularly attachment trauma (Allen, 2012, 
2013), may trigger a profound destruction of trust.  There may be other reasons but, 
once epistemic trust has been lost, its absence creates an apparent rigidity.  The 
rigidity is perceived by the communicator, who expects the recipient to modify his/her 
behavior on the basis of the information they received and apparently understood; 
yet in the absence of trust, the capacity for change is absent.  The information given 
by the communicator is not used to update the recipient’s understanding.  In terms of 
the theory of natural pedagogy (G. Csibra & Gergely, 2009), the person has a 
(temporarily) reduced capacity to learn from “teachers”.  From a therapist’s 
standpoint, he/she has become “hard to reach” and potentially interpersonally 
inaccessible.  Looked at in another way, PD could be seen as a disorder of 
communication: chronic epistemic vigilance limits the capacity to internalize available 
knowledge as something that is “safe” to use to organize behavior. 
Mentalizing as a Mediator of the Effectiveness of Psychotherapy  
We have previously suggested, in a somewhat grandiose manner, that 
mentalizing provided an integrative framework that could bring together brain and 
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mind within a singular discourse and that a range of therapeutic modalities could be 
considered jointly, with mentalizing as their  “common language” (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy & Bateman, 2006).  In other words, we have suggested that 
mentalizing was a common factor in psychotherapy whilst also rather cheekily 
maintaining that it was specific to the approach of MBT (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006).   
In an intriguing and unique study, Goldman and Gregory (2010) demonstrated 
that the therapeutic process of identifying, acknowledging, and sequencing 
emotional experiences correlated highly with the reduction of BPD symptoms in 
outpatients with the disorder.  This is in line with our suggestion that the crux of the 
value of psychotherapy in BPD and a key factor with other clinical groups is the 
patient’s experience of another person having the patient’s mind in mind, and that 
therapy, regardless of the therapist’s theoretical orientation, works by reviving the 
patient’s capacity to interpret behavior as being motivated by mental states, both in 
themselves and in others (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004).   
In a study that compared different psychotherapeutic modalities to assess the 
extent to which mentalization was a factor common to different therapies, by using 
the Psychotherapy Process Q-set (Ablon & Jones, 2002), Goodman (2013) showed 
that the prototype for Transference-Focused Psychotherapy (TFP) correlated with 
the psychodynamic psychotherapy prototype; the prototype for DBT correlated with 
the CBT prototype; and an MBT prototype (RF process) loaded on both TFP and 
DBT prototypes.  Notably, the TFP prototype contained mentalizing items focused on 
the patient’s mentalization of the therapist or other relationships, whilst the 
mentalizing elements of the DBT prototype focused on the patients’ mentalization of 
themselves, perhaps in line with DBT’s incorporation of mindfulness practice.  
Goodman argues that the RF process prototype encompasses the assertion that 
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enhancing mentalizing is central to therapy with BPD patients, and may be a unifying 
factor for effective approaches.  Why should this be the case? 
Mentalizing as a Means by which Epistemic Trust is Established 
Mentalizing in the context of therapy must be distinguished from mentalizing 
in the social world. To “learn” to mentalize in treatment is not, in our view, an 
appropriate therapeutic aim.  In fact, mentalizing is a key part of the therapeutic 
process because it enhances our general ability to learn in and from social situations 
and to generally benefit from interpersonal experience.  Mentalizing in therapy is a 
generic way of establishing epistemic trust between the patient and the therapist with 
the aim of freeing the patient from rigidity, so that they can begin to learn from new 
experiences and achieve change in their understanding of their social relationships 
and their own behavior and actions.  Having the experience of our subjectivity being 
understood is the necessary key to open us up to learning that has the potential to 
change our perception of our social world.  Mentalizing our route to garnering 
knowledge relevant to us and being able to use it across contexts, independent of 
the learning experience.  Put simply, the experience of feeling thought about in 
therapy makes us feel safe enough to think about ourselves in relation to our world, 
and to learn something new about that world and how we operate in it.  
Mentalizing establishes a view of an individual as an agent, with a valid 
subjective experience that is worthy of engagement.  Establishing epistemic trust in 
the creation of a collaboration between patient and therapist, through the explicit 
effort of seeing the world from the patients’ standpoint, serves to open the patient’s 
mind to the therapist’s communication.  The patient moves toward being able to trust 
the social world as a learning environment once again.  This includes the therapeutic 
environment and all that is has to teach the individual about the nature of their 
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problems, the ways they have tried to cope with them in the past, and the options 
available to modify these strategies in the future.  These are of course the “wisdoms” 
that the therapist has acquired to impart through their training.  But as we shall 
explain in the next section, perhaps it is not what we learned to teach patients in 
therapy that matters most, but rather the potential of the therapeutic relationship to 
rekindle the capacity for learning from social situations.   
The Psychotherapeutic Communication Systems: Why is Psychotherapy 
Effective? 
We would like to argue that three sets of processes, which we will label 
“therapeutic communication systems”, underpin the mechanism of change in the 
numerous forms of psychosocial treatment that have been found to be effective We 
suggest that the three systems relate to each other cumulatively to make change in 
revising an individual’s experience of themselves as a consequence of therapy. 
From our point of view, a change in what Bowlby (1980) termed the ‘internal working 
model’ of attachment relationships (incorporating expectations about both self and 
other as well as expectations of the likely interaction between the two) is the critical 
change in therapy form which changes in symptoms and the quality of social 
adaptation follow. In individuals in a state of epistemic mistrust and hypervigilance, 
internal working models are impermeable to influence from social experience and 
such individuals are viewed as ‘hard to reach’ when considered outside a therapeutic 
context (and sometimes even inside it).  
Communication System 1: The Teaching and Learning of Content 
All evidence-based psychotherapies provide a coherent, consistent, and 
continuous framework that enables the patient to examine the issues that are 
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deemed to be central according to a particular theoretical approach (e.g., early 
schemas, invalidating experiences, object relations, current attachment experiences) 
in a safe and relatively low-arousal context.  Thus, these psychotherapies provide 
the patient with helpful skills or knowledge, such as strategies to handle emotional 
dysregulation or restructured interpersonal relationship schemata.  Perhaps more 
importantly however, all evidence-based psychotherapies implicitly provide for the 
patient a model of mind and an understanding of their disorder, as well as a 
hypothetical appreciation of the process of change, that are accurate enough to 
enable the patient to feel recognized as an agent with intentionality.  The model 
contains considerable personally relevant information so the patient experiences 
feeling markedly mirrored or “understood”.  Helpful, directive approaches may be 
more likely to communicate a clear recognition of the patient’s position than a 
generic exploratory style (McAleavey & Castonguay, 2013).  The idea that 
psychotherapies have in common the creation of a sense of being understood while 
differing in the understandings they provide has been part of integrative approaches 
to psychotherapy since , common factor approaches were first proposed (e.g., Frank 
& Frank, 1991; Prochaska & Norcross, 2013; Rogers, 1951).   
In essence, these (implicit or explicit) explanations may be seen as ostensive 
cues that signal to the patient the relevance to them of information that is being 
conveyed by triggering in the patient a feeling of being personally recognized by the 
therapist.  This process is important because it allows the patient to reduce epistemic 
hypervigilance as he/she increasingly sees the model’s relevance to his/her own 
state of mind.  Thus, acquiring new skills and learning new and useful information 
about oneself has the nonspecific effect of creating openness, which makes it easier 
for the patient to learn the specific suggestions conveyed within the model.  A 
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virtuous cycle is created: the patient “feels” the personal truth of the evidence-based 
content conveyed, which, because it is accurate and helpful, in turn generates 
epistemic openness; the growth of epistemic trust allows the patient to take in further 
information that also serves to reassure and validate them.  The learning process is 
facilitated by the patient’s experience of feeling mentalized by the “felt truth” of the 
content being communicated, either through its correspondence with 
phenomenology or through practical experience.  
A wide range of explanations of experience will assist patients whose ‘grip’ on 
their own subjectivity is momentarily loose. Finding oneself prone to emotional 
outburst, an account in terms of a failure of emotion regulation is helpful.  But so 
might be an account in terms of failures of appropriate soothing in early childhood, or 
the internalization of an aggressive self-critical voice. ‘Felt truth’ can come from 
biological as well as from social accounts but one may expect such explanations to 
be less compelling. One patient, for example, felt understood and validated by my 
hypothesis that their chronic suspicion when faced with the challenge of trusting 
others could be understood in terms of attachment experiences that were a 
catastrophic accumulation of disappointment.  We know that without a coherent body 
of knowledge based on a systematically established set of principles, psychological 
therapy is of little value (Benish, Imel, & Wampold, 2008).  Even in large cohort study 
meta-analyses, therapies without a credible and tight intellectual frame are observed 
to fail (Abbass, Rabung, Leichsenring, Refseth, & Midgley, 2013).   
The fact that so many different therapies, using so many different theoretical 
models, have been found to have some beneficial effect indicates that the 
significance of communication system 1 lies perhaps not in the essential truth of the 
“wisdom” of the specific approach, but in the fact that it causes the patient to give 
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weight to communication from the social world (Ahn & Wampold, 2001; Paris, 2013).  
This brings us to the second communication system at work in psychotherapy. 
Communication System 2: The Re-emergence of Robust Mentalizing 
The experience of being provided with understanding creates a shift in the 
quality of interpersonal communication and generates a stepwise improvement in 
communication competence.  As noted above, through passing on knowledge and 
skills that feel appropriate and helpful, the therapist implicitly recognizes the patient’s 
agency.  The therapist’s presentation of information that is personally relevant to the 
patient serves as a form of ostensive cueing that conveys the impression that the 
therapist seeks to understand the patient’s perspective; this in turn enables the 
patient to listen and to hear.  In effect, the therapist is modeling (demonstrating) how 
he/she engages in mentalizing in relation to the patient.  It is important that in this 
process both patient and therapist come to see each other more clearly as 
intentional agents.  It is not sufficient for the therapist to present their “mentalizing 
wisdom” to the patient if they are not themselves clearly seen as an agentive actor 
whose actions are predictable given the principles of theoretical rationality (Kiraly et 
al., 2013).  The context of an open and trustworthy social situation facilitates 
achievement of a better understanding of the beliefs, wishes, and desires 
underpinning the actions of others and of the self.  This allows for a more trusting 
relationship in the consulting room.  Ideally, the patient’s feeling of having been 
sensitively responded to by the therapist opens a second virtuous cycle in 
interpersonal communication in which the patient’s own capacity to mentalize is 
regenerated. 
However, the mentalizing of patients—that is, acting in accordance with the 
patient’s perspective—may be a common factor across psychotherapies not 
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because patients need to learn about the contents of their minds or those of others, 
but because mentalizing may be a generic way of increasing epistemic trust and 
therefore achieving change in mental function.  We would maintain that the patient’s 
capacity to mentalize improves in all effective therapies.  This is likely to have 
generic benefits in increasing the patient’s self-control and sense of self-coherence; 
it increases the accuracy of their social understanding, reduces their experience of 
mental pain, and improves their ability to think coherently in the context of 
attachment relationships.  This has been a key part of our understanding of the 
mechanisms of change since we devised the MBT model (Fonagy & Bateman, 
2006).  Understanding the patient’s subjectivity is vital to this process, as the 
patient’s self-discovery as an active agent occurs through the social interchange 
where they experience themselves as an agent in the mind of their therapist—they 
“find themselves in the mind of the therapist”.  It is also vital to a further function of 
therapy, which we wish to note separately: the (re-)kindling of the patient’s wish to 
learn about the world, including the social world.  In brief, and to simplify what we 
believe is a complex and non-linear process, the insight obtained in therapy, 
whatever its content, creates or re-creates the potential for a learning experience, 
which in turn makes other similar learning experiences more productive because it 
enables the patient to adopt a stance of learning from experience by increasing their 
capacity to mentalize.1 
                                                 
1
 In using this phrase we are leaning heavily on Wilfred Bion’s discoveries (Bion, 1962). We are doing this 
intentionally to explicitly acknowledge the intellectual indebtedness we feel, although we are equally aware that 
those who see themselves as maintaining his tradition may well be dismayed by our claim of intellectual 
communion. 
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We would like to underline a point that may seem initially puzzling given our 
own declared commitment to mentalization-based psychotherapy: mentalizing in 
itself is not the therapeutic objective.  Simply instructing the therapist to focus the 
patient on their own thoughts and feelings, or the thoughts and feelings of those 
around them, will not achieve change by itself.  It may, along with other techniques, 
initiate change by changing the mindset of the person undergoing treatment.  
However, the process of creating a more robust mentalizing function in therapy 
(communication system 2) can no more assure enduring alteration in the patient than 
does communication system 1.  True and lasting improvement rests on 
communication system 3: learning from experience beyond therapy.   
Communication System 3: The Re-emergence of Social Learning 
We hypothesize that feeling understood opens a key biological route to 
information transmission and the possibility of taking in knowledge that is felt to be 
personally relevant and generalizable; this is what brings about change in previously 
rigidly held beliefs.  In essence, the experience of feeling thought about enables us 
to learn new things about our social world.  
The therapeutic situation teaches about sources of knowledge.  It provides a 
clear social illustration of trust, making the therapist a “deferential source” of 
knowledge (D. Wilson & D. Sperber, 2012) with the capacity to undo previously 
rigidly held beliefs about the self and about others, and to reduce the patient’s 
experience of epistemic isolation, which is embodied in the rigidity of their subjective 
experience.  This initiates a third virtuous cycle.  Improved understanding of social 
situations through improved mentalizing leads to better understanding of significant 
others in the patient’s life, which in turn creates potential for the person to notice a 
sensitive response and feel understood.  Reopening the potential to feel sensitively 
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responded to—both within and outside the therapeutic setting—may in itself initiate 
more trusting interpersonal relationships, and thus open the patient up to new 
understandings of specific social situations as these arise. 
We hypothesize that, as the patient’s state of epistemic hypervigilance 
relaxes, his/her capacity for trust increases and he/she can discover new ways of 
learning about others.  This facilitates an increase in the patient’s willingness to 
modify his/her cognitive structures for interpreting others’ behavior.  Social 
experiences that may have been positive but were in the past discounted as a result 
of the patient’s epistemic hypervigilance now have the potential to have a positive 
impact.  This is the third system of communication, which becomes available once 
the second system, tied to the therapeutic situation, has enhanced the patient’s 
capacity to mentalize.  As patients begin to experience social interactions in a more 
benign way and view their social situations more accurately (e.g., not seeing an 
experience of temporary social disappointment as an outright rejection), they update 
their knowledge of both themselves and others.   
It is the recovery of capacity for social information exchange that, we feel, is at 
the heart of effective psychotherapies.  They impart an ability to benefit from benign 
social intentions, and to update and build on knowledge about the self and others in 
social situations.  The improved sense of epistemic trust derived from mentalizing 
enables learning from social experience; in this way the third virtuous cycle is 
maintained beyond therapy.  
As therapists we often assume that the process in the consulting room is the 
primary driver of change, but experience shows us that change is also brought about 
by what happens beyond therapy, in the person’s social environment.  Empirical 
evidence from studies where change was monitored session by session suggests 
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that the therapeutic alliance in a given session foretells change in the next 
(Falkenstrom, Granstrom, & Holmqvist, 2013; Tasca & Lampard, 2012).  This 
suggests that the change that occurs in between sessions is a consequence of 
changed attitudes to learning engendered by therapy.  The implication is that the 
extent of the benefit a patient derives from therapy may depend on what he/she 
encounters in his/her particular social world.  We predict that psychotherapy for BPD 
is much more likely to succeed if the individual’s social environment at the time of 
treatment is largely benign.  Although we do not know of any systematic studies that 
have explored this moderator, clinical experience suggests that there is likely to be 
some validity to this assertion.   
This admittedly speculative model offers a way to integrate the specific and 
nonspecific factors in effective psychotherapy.  Specific factors associated with 
“therapies that work” create experiences of truth, which in turn encourage the patient 
to learn more.  In this process, via a nonspecific channel, the patient’s capacity to 
mentalize is fostered.  Both these systems would be expected to lead to 
symptomatic improvement.  Improved mentalizing and reduced symptomatology 
both improve the patient’s experiences of social relationships.  It is likely that these 
new social experiences, rather than only what happens within therapy, serve to 
erode the epistemic hypervigilance that has hitherto prevented benign social 
interactions from changing an individual’s experience of themselves and of the social 
world.  Change is thus likely due to transformations of the ways a person uses their 
social environment, not just to what happens in therapy.   
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Summary 
Mentalizing in the therapeutic relationship is a complex process.  Patients with 
the diagnosis of BPD often struggle in therapy because their disorder serves to 
undermine their capacity to benefit from the therapeutic process, whatever its 
modality.  Individual or group therapy, particularly of an unstructured kind, can serve 
to activate the attachment system, causing what may be a catastrophic collapse of 
mentalizing.  It is hardly surprising that in such situations patients often abandon 
therapy against the advice of their therapist.  Awareness of the nature of the 
mentalizing problems that BPD patients face can help in managing these challenging 
situations.  The MBT technique was designed to guide therapists to avoid this type of 
iatrogenesis in the course of treatment. 
MBT is not the only effective therapy for BPD.  In fact, many therapies can 
consider themselves “evidence-based”.  In this paper we have speculated that 
mentalizing may play a role in the change process regardless of modality.  Based on 
modern formulations of the communication and learning process, and in line with 
most formulations of “common factors” in psychotherapy, we have suggested that 
limitations in patients’ capacity to learn from experience (i.e., being “hard to reach”) 
are generically overcome by specific interventions that make patients feel 
understood.  Mentalizing is a common tool for achieving this sense of being 
individually responded to.  Feeling understood in therapy restores trust in learning 
from social experience (epistemic trust) but at the same time also serves to 
regenerate a capacity for social understanding (mentalizing).  Improved social 
understanding alongside increased epistemic trust makes life outside therapy a 
setting in which new information about oneself and about the world can be acquired 
and internalized.  Ultimately, it may be that therapeutic change is not due to new 
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skills or new insights gained in the consulting room, but rather to the capacity of the 
therapeutic relationship to create a potential for learning about oneself and others in 
the world outside of therapy.  In the past, modifications of the patient’s social world 
were felt to fall outside the concerns of psychotherapy.  It is possible, however, that 
effective treatments depend as much on ensuring that the patient’s social 
environment is benign as on ensuring a similar emotional tone in the consulting 
room.  
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